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Decades ago, military sociologists predicted a rising trend among officers away 
from traditional institutional military values and toward more economically-based 
occupational values due to the effects of the transition from a conscription-based military 
to an all-volunteer force.  Subsequent empirical research resulted in data that supports 
such predictions. More recent researchers have suggested that in addition to the all 
volunteer force, an increase on technology may also accelerate the trend toward 
occupationalism and away from traditional institutional military values and the warrior 
ethos that typically define successful military organizations. The officer corps may be 
particularly vulnerable to occupationalism due to increased technical specialization and 
the corporate mindset that is evolving within the service, potentially resulting in reduced 
organizational commitment and a greater reliance on extrinsic motivational incentives.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of rank structures on 
professionalism in the context of Moskos’ institutional versus occupational (I/O) 
professionalism model.  Previous studies utilizing the I/O model have been primarily 
limited to Air Force officers and suggest a trend toward occupationalism among this 
group.  This study proposes that a much broader sample of Air Force personnel is 
required to determine the magnitude of this trend, both in the officer ranks as well as the 
NCO ranks.  This study analyzes the roots of military professionalism, considers the 
impact of recent transformations in the military, and makes recommendations about 
enhancing professionalism within the Air Force among all ranks. 
 
 v
Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents.................................................................................................................v 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... viii 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 
II. History of Military Rank Structure .................................................................................6 
Foundations ..................................................................................................................6 
Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps...................................................................7 
The Officer Corps.........................................................................................................8 
Academics ..................................................................................................................11 
III. Military Professionalism..............................................................................................15 
Defining Professionalism ...........................................................................................15 
The Military as a Profession.......................................................................................16 
Moskos’ Institutional-Occupational Model................................................................22 
An Occupational Shift ................................................................................................26 
Contemporary Issues ..................................................................................................30 
IV. Thesis Argument..........................................................................................................32 
NCO Institutionalism..................................................................................................32 
Enlisted PME..............................................................................................................37 
Officer PME ...............................................................................................................38 
The Profession of Arms..............................................................................................38 
Enlisted Promotion System ........................................................................................39 
Officer Promotion System..........................................................................................40 
 
Page 
Impact on Professionalism .........................................................................................41 
Research Question and Propositions ..........................................................................43 
Summary.....................................................................................................................43 
V. Discussion .....................................................................................................................45 
Conclusion..................................................................................................................50 
Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire ...................................................................................52 
Appendix C.  Enlisted Promotion Criteria.........................................................................60 
Appendix D:  Officer Performance Report and Promotion Recommendation Forms.......63 
Appendix E.  Sample Enlisted Performance Report..........................................................66 




List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 1. Institutional Rate Increase…………………………………………….……….36 
Figure 2. A Literal Interpretation of Moskos’ I/O Model................................................. 48




List of Tables 
Page 
Table 1.  Institutional Versus Occupational Variables ..................................................... 24 
Table 2.  Multivariate Tests (Hotelling's T2) for Institution and Occupation Measures... 36 
Table 3.  AF Officer and Enlisted Assigned..................................................................... 44 
 
 1
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE USAF: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 
 
I.  Introduction 
I go anywhere in the world they tell me to go, any time they 
tell me to, to fight anybody they want me to fight.  I move 
my family anywhere they tell me to move, on a day’s 
notice and live in whatever quarters they assign me.  I work 
whenever they tell me to work…I don’t belong to a union 
and I don’t strike if I don’t like what they’re doing to me.  
And I like it.  Maybe that’s the difference (Webb, 1983). 
 
Professionalism is defined as the professional character, spirit or standing, 
practice or methods of a professional (Steinmetz, & Barnhart, 1980).  While the essence 
of professionalism can be described in ideal terms such as character, integrity, and 
commitment, the desired output of professionalism is performance.  Performance 
provides the incentives to do well and fuels the professional’s drive toward excellence 
(Sorley, 1998).  The values necessary to consistently perform at a high level can best be 
internalized through identification with a profession and a complete understanding of the 
profession’s requirements (Grier, 2004).  
Innumerable definitions and theories have been developed over the years by 
social scientists attempting to describe military professionalism (Huntington, 1959; 
Janowitz, 1960; Millett & Murray, 1987; Moskos & Wood, 1988).  Although they may 
differ on the details, they all agree that the military professional must possess 
characteristics unique from general society in order to effectively “manage” the violence 
inherent in warfare.  In particular, Moskos’s (1977) Institutional/Occupational (I/O) 
model attempts to rationalize military professionalism within a continuum of civil-
military interactions ranging from a military entirely detached from society to one closely 
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aligned with civilian structures.   
Moskos (1977) characterizes an institutional military member as having a high 
level of commitment, strong service identification, and willingness to sacrifice with little 
regard for economic considerations.  According to Moskos’ (1977) definition, an 
institutionally oriented military member perceives professionalism through intangible, 
intrinsic factors; the very act of “serving” in the organization often results in personal 
satisfaction even under difficult circumstances.  The institutional member views the 
military as a “professional calling,” rather than a job, and would be less likely to separate 
simply for higher pay or better working conditions.  At the opposite end of the Moskos 
(1977) I/O spectrum, an occupation is legitimized in terms of the marketplace.  Salary 
and careerism are paramount as occupational military members focus on extrinsic factors 
such as economic benefits and rewards (Moskos & Wood, 1988).  Attaining rank or 
status and building a résumé for post military service would be characteristic of an 
organization dominated by individual concerns (Moskos & Wood, 1988).       
The I/O model is particularly relevant to the Air Force due to the service’s 
reliance on technological specialization and relative lack of tradition when compared to 
the other services (Smith, 1998; Vest, 2000).  Studies conducted from the late 1970s 
through the late 1990s to determine the level of occupationalism in the Air Force, focused 
primarily on the officer corps.  The results indicated that the Air Force officer corps has 
trended toward a more occupational orientation, which according to Moskos (1977) is not 
preferable (Moskos & Wood, 1988; Smith, 1998; Stashevsky & Koslowsky, 2006; 
Thomas, 2004).  
Moskos (1977) and retired Air Force colonel, Frank Wood (1988), believe the 
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results of ‘creeping occupationalism’ will have a negative impact on military 
effectiveness.  They identified three key areas—mission performance, member 
motivation, and professional responsibility, that rely on institutional values.  Other factors 
aside, a military with a strong institutional orientation has always been more effective 
than a mass of individuals collected temporarily for the purpose of conducting a war 
(Snider, 2003; Thomas, 2004; Trim, 2003).  A pervasive, AF-wide shift toward 
occupationalism could prove particularly damaging to mission accomplishment (Shields 
& Hofer, 1988; Sivasubramaniam, Murry, Avolio, & Jung, 2002; Snider, 2003).   
A sense of institutional dedication is important for all members of a military 
organization.  Commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and airman 
alike, should adhere to the same standards of conduct and commitment that enhance 
military effectiveness as stipulated by AF Core Values (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005). 
NCOs in particular, occupy a unique position in the hierarchical rank structure between 
the officer corps and the enlisted airmen.  NCOs execute leadership and management 
duties very similar to those of officers and are often required to perform a greater amount 
of interpersonal supervision with subordinates.  This direct, ‘face to face’ contact is often 
necessary to modify and correct the behavior of less mature subordinates and to control 
the large numbers of airman involved in support of mission goals.  Consequently, the 
professionalism of the NCO corps may be as influential, if not more so, on the 
performance of the AF.  History is replete with wars and battles that may have been won 
by sheer luck, overwhelming forces, or exceptional leadership, but when both sides are 
equal in tangible assets, it seems reasonable to expect the military organization with the 
greater level of professionalism should have the superior commitment to winning 
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(Stashevsky & Koslowsky, 2006; Trim, 2003; Ullman & Getler, 1996). 
Despite the suggested decline of institutional values among Air Force officers 
(Moskos & Wood, 1988; Moore, 1998; Stahl, Manley, & McNichols, 1978), the service 
has consistently fulfilled mission requirements in recent conflicts.  This continued 
military effectiveness is difficult to explain considering an apparent erosion of 
professionalism among AF officers.  Perhaps there is a stabilizing force that has 
counteracted this negative trend.  Considering the typical hierarchical pyramid structure 
of the Air Force, a large proportion of AF members are supervised by NCOs at lower 
levels, thus emphasizing the important role of the NCOs as leaders.  A study conducted in 
1978 among Air Force personnel indicated that senior NCOs are significantly more 
institutional than junior enlisted, while senior officers are only slightly more institutional 
than junior officers (Stahl et al., 1978).  Enlisted members experience a greater rate 
increase in institutionalism over time when compared to officers and may conceivably 
impart a stabilizing influence on the AF as the institutionalism among the officer corps 
gradually decays (Moore, 1998; Snider, 2003; Stahl et al., 1978).  The officer corps may 
indirectly rely upon on this institutional foundation for the performance of tasks at the 
operational level.   
Institutionalism among NCOs is no doubt influenced by the indoctrinization 
process that begins at basic training and is continually reinforced in the enlisted 
professional military education program as well as incentivised in the enlisted promotion 
process (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  NCO development involves constant indoctrination 
and familiarization with fundamental principles of military service emphasizing AF 
doctrine, tradition, and standards of conduct (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  In particular, 
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the promotion system requires a great deal of general military knowledge to attain higher 
rank.   
The Air Force officer corps is initially subjected to indoctrinization in the various 
commissioning programs and basic training, but formal indoctrinization significantly 
tapers off, thus relying on the individual initiatives of officers to maintain their 
knowledge on AF doctrine, traditions, and standards of conduct (Davis & Donnini, 1991).  
In addition, the officer promotion process is based almost purely on job performance, 
which may indirectly involve a subjective evaluation of professionalism, but lacks any 
objective criteria related to knowledge of or appreciation for Air Force doctrine, tradition, 
and standards of conduct (Davis & Donnini, 1991).  Considering this drastic difference 
between the indoctrinization approaches of the officer and NCO corps, is it reasonable to 
expect a variation in their respective levels of institutionalism. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential differences in insitutionalism 
between commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers, and investigate possible 
causes of the trend toward occupationalism observed among officers (Stahl et al., 1978; 
Smith, 1998; Snider, Nagl & Pfaff, 1999) as initially reported by Moskos (1977). Despite 
subsequent research studies (Cotton, 1983; Moskos & Chambers, 1993; Moskos, 
Williams, & Segal, 2000; Smith, 1998; Stahl et al., 1978), none has considered the 
differences between commissioned and non-commissioned officers using the I/O model.  
This study will attempt to build an argument that justifies alleviating this research gap by 





II. History of Military Rank Structure  
Foundations 
Since the beginning of civilization, nations that were able to organize and field 
superior combat forces have enjoyed great success, typically at the expense of their 
neighbors.  In ancient times, warring factions generally created armies on a temporary 
basis, relying on ordinary citizens to fill out the ranks.  These forces typically united just 
long enough to participate in a campaign, usually following a predictable cycle aligned 
with the seasons (Keegan, 1993).  Following battle, armies quickly disbanded and 
returned to more immediate pursuits (farming, construction, administration, etc.) 
indispensable to daily life.  It is hardly a coincidence that civilizations able to organize 
and maintain military forces on a more permanent basis began to expand their boundaries 
and dominate neighboring populations.   
Advances in military organization led to several great early civilizations, such as 
those in Mesopotamia, Greece, and Egypt and perhaps reached a zenith in Italy where the 
Romans dominated the known world for centuries (Keegan, 1993).  In fact, it is the 
Romans that are often credited with laying the foundation for the modern military forces 
of today.  The Romans created a highly effective combat force primarily through superior 
administration and organization.  They certainly enjoyed many technical advances over 
their rivals, but their true advantage is generally attributed to the quality of the average 
soldier and the institutionalism of superior tactics and battlefield management (Gibbon, 
1946).  Roman recruits enjoyed many ‘perks’ in return for their service, including good 
pay, adequate medical care, guaranteed citizenship, and perhaps most importantly, high 
status within a society that embraced conflict and honored individuals that excelled at 
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warfare.  The attributes of the typical soldier almost certainly contribute to the historical 
perception of the Roman military as a highly ‘professional’ organization; certainly 
Roman military success has rarely been matched in the course of history (Keegan, 1993). 
Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps 
 All NCO ranks are based on the title ‘sergeant’ which is derived from the Latin 
phrase ‘who serves’ (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).   Some historians draw parallels with 
the Roman ‘Centurion’ and the 17th century ‘sergeant’ of Gustavus Adolphus’s Swedish 
Army, while the American version was certainly founded with the first Continental Army 
in 1775 (Keegan, 1993; Cross, 2006).  Regardless of their exact origin, the NCO ranks 
arose chiefly out of organizational necessity.  As armies continued to expand and 
battlefield maneuver became increasingly complex, senior leaders found it difficult to 
exercise adequate tactical command (e.g., fog of war).  The solution was an 
‘intermediate’ level of leadership within the military hierarchy able to control massed 
formations and ensure the directions of senior leaders could effectively be translated into 
actual military action.  These leaders would serve as liaisons between the senior 
commanders and the regular soldier and also provide close supervision, discipline, and 
training for new conscripts. 
NCOs serving in this capacity were forced to concentrate on the ‘art of war’ and 
tended to become experts in military matters.  In ancient times this arrangement was 
particularly important due to the fact that many senior leaders had little or no actual 
combat experience or appreciation for the intricacies of tactical warfare (Keegan, 1985).  
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Commanders, generally appointed for social and political considerations, relied heavily 
on NCOs to provide leadership, direction, discipline, and training for the largely 
unskilled mass of troops.  Perhaps most importantly, NCOs ensured the leader’s vision 
could be transformed into operational results.  Even if the senior commander (officer) 
possessed awesome leadership skill and/or charisma that inspired great deeds, the 
operational leader (NCO) was still necessary to ensure the average soldier’s enthusiasm 
could be converted into actual combat effectiveness (Lee, 2005).  
The Officer Corps 
They looked upon themselves as men who lived by higher 
standards of behavior than civilians, as men who were 
bearers and protectors of the most important values of 
American life, who maintained a sense of discipline while 
civilians abandoned themselves to hedonism, who 
maintained a sense of honor while civilians lived by 
opportunism and greed (comments regarding the 
professionalism of pilots selected to be America’s first 
astronauts; Wolfe, 1979). 
 
 It may be surprising to note that the Roman’s awesome military achievements 
were accomplished without the presence of an officer corps in the modern sense.  
‘Regular’ soldiers ascended to higher leadership positions through outstanding 
performance and battlefield prowess.   In particular, the Roman ‘Tribune,’ who exercised 
operational leadership and direction over the Legion, has been likened by some historians 
(Gibbon, 1946; Keegan, 1993) to the modern officer.  The Tribune’s expertise in warfare 
contributes to the notion that the average ‘rank and file’ of the Legion comprised the true 
‘professional’ body of Roman formations; commanders were often assigned through 
political appointment with no consideration of military aptitude and generally devoid of 
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any practical battlefield experience (Gibbon, 1946).  The ‘commander,’ officially titled as 
‘Consul,’ just pointed the army in the right direction and expected the highly trained 
soldiers to do the rest (Gibbon, 1946; Keegan, 1995; Cross, 2006).  While this 
arrangement proved successful in most situations, the questionable military ability of 
most political appointees could also prove disastrous.  For example, Consul Varro, 
against the strong objections of his generals, led the Roman Army to its single greatest 
defeat in history at the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C.  The Carthaginian Army led by 
Hannibal (raised as a soldier) slaughtered perhaps as many as 70, 000 Roman soldiers in 
a single day and nearly brought the Republic to its knees (Keegan, 1993). 
The need for a dedicated body of long serving professional managers really 
manifested itself during the Middle Ages as military forces became larger and more 
difficult to control.  During this period, the Feudal system so prevalent in Western 
society, ensured nearly every significant military leadership position would be filled by 
individuals of ‘noble birth,’ wealth, or otherwise high social standing (Keegan, 1993).  
This tradition continued to some extent well into the 20th century, though the French 
Revolution and Napoleon’s subsequent rise from a mere corporal to Emperor of France, 
may have been instrumental in attenuating the practice (Cross, 2006).  In fact, Napoleon 
is often credited with recognizing that advances in technology and the logistic 
requirements of large armies necessitated the creation of specialists not directly involved 
in battle (Cross, 2006).  Though less glamorous than traditional combat roles, the army 
couldn’t adequately function without them.  Many ‘officers,’ as they were now known, 
specialized in operational matters while others focused on support and administration 
(Sorley, 1998; Trim, 2003).  The modern officer corps was born in reaction to the new 
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realities of warfare and represented a significant step in the evolution of armed conflict.     
In conjunction with the Industrial Revolution of late 18th through early 20th 
centuries, great strides in weapons technology, transportation, and communication 
systems significantly increased the capability of nations to wage war.  This 
unprecedented ‘killing power’ coupled with rapidly expanding armies gave rise to 
‘modern warfare’ (Cross, 2006).  The primary goal of many emerging industrialized 
nations was to create a highly trained nucleus around which the massed conscript armies 
could be rallied in times of rapid growth or national emergency.  Warfare was becoming 
so complicated, various military academies were created to educate officers on the proper 
conduct of war and to instill basic operational doctrine.  Military academy graduates 
would share a common outlook and could be expected to react in an appropriate and 
predictable manner in a given situation.  These early military institutions were dedicated 
to teaching the ‘art of war;’ other, more ‘academic’ subjects were only taught to 
specialists, like engineers, cartographers, and the like (van Creveld, 1990).  In particular, 
the Prussian Kriegsakademie, whose graduates would form the much praised ‘General 
Staff,’ is considered one of the most successful military institutes in history and the 
model for all subsequent Western military academies (van Creveld, 1990).  Lessons 
learned from actual battlefield experience were incorporated in the Kriegsakademie 
curriculum as instructors were drawn from operational units and placed on special 
assignment.  Such an assignment was considered extremely prestigious within the 
Prussian (later German) military and often represented the pinnacle of an officer’s career. 
While the initial selection criteria for officers still relied primarily on social 
standing rather than aptitude or proven performance, the military academies introduced 
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strict controls on attendees.   Candidates were selected from the existing officer corps to 
attend an academy on a highly competitive basis; the difficulty of the mandatory entrance 
exam and other rigorous entrance standards ensured most officers would never be 
selected.  The average length of training was also much longer—generally two years or 
more, and the graduation rate was not the 100% so common in contemporary institutions.  
Graduates of military academies constituted an ‘elite’ cadre of officers destined for 
coveted leadership positions at the highest levels of command (van Creveld, 1990).  
While the level of formal training and education may have varied among 
individual officers, with only limited numbers receiving the prestigious military academy 
training, the overriding theme of officership was acceptance into a ‘professional’ military 
fraternity dedicated to the needs of the nation at large.  Officers were expected to act with 
absolute integrity in all situations while maintaining the highest level of professional 
competence possible.  Differentiating themselves from the mass of ‘regular’ conscripts, 
officers served as role models for subordinates and were expected to be capable of great 
acts of courage—they led from the front and endured the same risks and hardships as the 
common soldier.  In fact, it wasn’t unusual, even well into the 20th century, for officers to 
suffer appalling casualty rates due to this particular creed (Keegan, 1985). 
Academics  
 Possession of a bachelor’s degree has become the most objective criteria for 
officer program qualification; however, the concept that officers require an academic 
degree is actually a fairly recent phenomenon.  Throughout the centuries preceding the 
industrial revolution, armed conflict was thought of as anything other than a learned 
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affair to be mastered through study.  One did not attend school, study books or take 
examinations to be an officer.  Officers were typically appointed based on social position, 
family tradition, or exceptional performance in combat.  In fact, the U.S. military still 
regularly bestowed ‘battlefield commissions’ on enlisted members as late as the Korean 
conflict (Keegan, 1993).  Learning tactics and strategy directly relating to warfare and 
actual battlefield experience were considered the proper foundation for officership.   
As warfare evolved toward the latter 18th and early 19th centuries, the idea that 
officers required formal instruction began to take hold.  However, the curriculum at 
military academies wasn’t academic in nature; it focused almost exclusively on the art of 
warfare and students didn’t receive academic degrees upon graduation.  The concept of 
college educated officers really gained momentum in the U.S. during the period 
immediately following WWII.  That the U.S. military had so many college educated 
officers really occurred by accident.  During the massive buildup preceding and during 
the war, recruits were required to take aptitude tests to determine rank and specialty.  
Predictably, the more educated the applicant, the higher the score.  Thus, the more 
academically qualified applicants systematically became officers.  This method, while 
logically relying on intelligence as a predictor of performance, may not have been as 
effective a measure of leadership potential (Bass, Jung, Avolio, & Berson, 2003).   
The officer corps in America was basically transformed through an expedient 
selection process necessitated by WWII, which may have resulted in certain individuals 
not possessing the optimal combat leadership qualities entering the officer corps.  
Leadership is a multidimensional construct that relies on many factors other than 
intellect—empathy, character, communication skill—just to name a few, and sociologists 
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and psychologists are continually developing and testing theories that predict an 
individual’s leadership potential (Zaleznik, 1977; Goldberg, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1995).  
Perhaps a selection criteria favoring intelligence over all other considerations, may not be 
the most effective for a military organization attempting to identify and cultivate 
individuals destined for leadership positions.  
Regardless, during the 1950s America became enamored with the idea that 
professionals in any discipline required a college education, and the officer corps was no 
exception.  Officers that didn’t possess degrees often found themselves at a disadvantage 
when dealing with civilian counterparts engaged in the nation’s growing ‘military 
industrial complex.’  Thus, an evolution spurred by the need for social equality and the 
increasing complexity of weapon systems resulted in the requirement for officers to hold 
academic degrees.   “In a world that had abandoned God in favor of science, a degree 
came to be widely regarded as the next best highway to heaven” (van Creveld, 1990: 70).   
Military academies of the late 18th through early 20th century, with their extremely 
rigorous selection procedures and curriculum focused on ‘military art,’ have largely 
become relics of the past.  The very limited number of elite, operationally experienced  
staff officers they produced— true experts in the art and execution of war—have 
basically been replaced by large numbers of college educated ‘technicians’ who likely 
have little or no operational experience (Snider, 1999).  This is particularly true of the Air 
Force, as opportunities for actual combat experience (excepting pilots) are limited, and 
job specialties are perhaps the most technically demanding of the armed forces (Smith, 
1998).  
Despite the continued overall trend toward technical specialization, the armed 
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forces can’t realistically rely solely on college educated applicants to fill the ranks.  The 
vast number of support and administrative specialties required to effectively operate a 
modern military organization necessitate minimal instruction and training to ensure troop 
levels can be maintained in the face of typical wartime attrition.  The enlisted force 
provides the manpower to fill these positions without the requisite four year ‘lead time’ 
typically required for college graduates.  In addition, the skills and training necessary to 
perform these specialties can be obtained after enlistment in the service.   
Enlisted recruits attend various technical training courses specific to their 
specialty immediately following basic military training.  The duration of the formal 
training varies with the complexity and nature of the specialty, but most require less than 
eight months of instruction. Upon initial assignment, airmen continue job proficiency 
training through a combination of formal, written instruction and informal ‘on-the-job’ 
training.  Qualification status is reflected through the use of certain ‘skill’ levels (3, 5, 7 
9) commiserate with technical ability and rank.  Most airmen are considered ‘fully 
qualified’ when the 5 skill level is attained, usually within three years of enlistment. 
It may be worthy to note that officers in the German Bundeswehr, though 
qualified and selected for commissioning prior to enlistment, must complete basic and 
advanced military training with their battalion and not in a specialized academy (van 
Creveld, 1990).  They are required to endure the same hardships as their future 
subordinates before being allowed to attend officer training school.  In addition, only 
officers that successfully gain a commission and agree to serve a full twelve year term are 
subsequently permitted to apply for advanced academic training (van Creveld, 1990). 
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III. Military Professionalism 
 
The military leader who views his oath of office as merely a 
contractual arrangement with his government sets the stage 
for a style of leadership critically different from the leader 
who views that oath as a pledge to contribute to the common 
good of his society.  For the former, “duty, honor, country” 
is a slogan adopted temporarily until the contract is 
completed, for the later, “duty, honor, country” is a way of 
life adopted for the good of all and accepted as a moral 




 A profession is defined as “a vocation requiring knowledge of some department 
of learning or science,” a professional as “one who follows an occupation as a means of 
livelihood or gain, or one who is engaged in one of the learned professions,” and finally, 
professionalism as “professional character, spirit or methods or the standing, practice, or 
methods of a professional as distinguished from an amateur (Editors of The American 
Heritage Dictionaries, 1993).”  Professionalism is possibly an overused term, but most 
organizations still desire professional status to add credibility to their respective 
enterprise (Bonen, 1982; Hebert, 2005).  Professions have codes, guidelines, creeds, 
oaths, commitment statements, belief statements—such as statements on ethics and 
professionalism (Adams, 1985).  Professionals in many professions are licensed, 
certified, and have specific initial and advanced education, as well as requirements for 
continuous education (Barnhart, 1994; Sarkesian & O'Connor, 1999). In addition, many 
professions require both initial and ongoing testing for admission and maintaining 
membership (Barnhart, 1994).  The military professional, while not possessing a specific 
degree or certification in warfare has long been considered an integral part of society and 
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has been bestowed professional status (Huntington, 1959; Janowitz, 1960). 
The Military as a Profession 
Although its nature and composition has evolved over time, the military is 
considered one of the traditional professions (Huntington, 1959).  Definitions of 
professionalism are extremely diverse and often difficult to apply to all the occupations 
that have earned professional status, especially if factors other than skill and training are 
considered.  Despite the lack of a universal definition for professionalism, it is certainly 
an important concept for military members, particularly those that occupy leadership 
positions (Janowitz et al., 1985).  Regardless of specific individual perceptions of 
professionalism, many military members appear to ascribe a great deal of importance to 
professional behavior (Daskevich, & Nafziger, 1980).    
A 1980 study measuring the attitudes of Air Staff and Command School (ASCS) 
students toward military service revealed that while there was no consensus on the 
meaning of professionalism, 87% felt that professionalism is important and 96% 
considered themselves professional officers (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980).  While the 
officers apparently identified with the concept of professionalism within their occupation, 
there was low identification with the officer corps as a major social grouping.  Sixty-eight 
percent identified more closely with their respective career field and immediate peers 
than with the officer corps as a whole (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980).  A subsequent Air 
University (AU) study conducted in 1997 involving students attending various officer 
professional military education (PME) courses identified a ‘lack of cohesion’ and a 
‘fractionalization’ of the Air Force officer corps around specific specialties (Smith, 
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1998).   
The significance of these findings may be more apparent if military service is 
considered distinct from typical civilian professions.  While frequently lumped together 
with other occupations, there are certain characteristics of military service that make it 
unique.  Members are technically on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and subject to 
recall even while on vacation.  Leaders frequently make life and death decisions as a 
matter of routine and then must deal with the consequences.  The stress can be enormous 
not only for the member, but for family and loved ones as well.  Perhaps most 
significantly, the ‘unlimited liability’ clause (Fogleman, 1995) inherent in military 
service requires members be willing to sacrifice life and limb without hesitation and as a 
matter of basic expectation, especially during times of war. 
When these factors are considered, the nature of military service in the Air Force 
may not be classified as a profession in the same manner as a physician, lawyer, or 
engineer.  These occupations are generally considered professions primarily because their 
practitioners are paid for a highly specialized skill desired by the general populace.  
These occupations often have a code of ethics or a moral contract with society, and while 
certainly scrutinized, they rarely receive the level of attention the ‘life and death’ 
struggles of the military demand.  Transgressions by physicians, lawyers, and engineers 
can have a catastrophic impact on individuals, such as wrongful incarceration, 
malpractice, faulty construction, etc., but the consequences of such failures are usually 
less grave for society as a whole.  If the military loses a war, the results can range from 
humiliation to subjugation, or in extreme cases, outright annihilation of the nation’s 
population (Cross, 2006; Keegan, 1993). 
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Superior technical ability and the application of specialized training to perform a 
given task for monetary gain may not completely describe the attributes necessary to be 
considered a military professional (Janowitz, 1960).  While military members are paid for 
practicing certain skills, it is difficult and perhaps unrealistic to describe the military 
profession in purely economic terms.  “At its heart, the military profession is a calling 
that requires a devotion to service and willingness to sacrifice at levels far beyond that 
required in the marketplace” (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005:171).  Innumerable definitions 
and theories have been developed over the years by social scientists (Huntington, 1959; 
Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1977; Sarkesian & O'Connor, 1999) attempting to describe the 
military and its interaction with society.  Their works are useful for understanding the 
complex relationship between society and military organizations.  They provide insight 
into various intrinsic and extrinsic factors that shape military culture and identify various 
elements and behaviors considered necessary for organizational effectiveness and 
performance of the duties unique to military service. 
Huntington 
Dr. Huntington’s (1959) book, The Soldier and the State, is considered an 
archetypal study of civil-military interaction and provides an extensive analysis of 
military professionalism.  Huntington (1959) considers a group ‘professional’ if it 
exhibits three key characteristics:  expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.  
Huntington’s (1959) work was primarily focused on the relationship of the officer corps 
with civilian society in economic, social, and political terms.  He perceived a blurring of 
the distinction between the historical warrior ethos and the modern military specialist.  
Military officers manage violence somewhat like bankers manage money. 
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Huntington (1959) views the first characteristic of professionalism, expertise, to 
be comprised of three components:  technical, theoretical or intellectual, and broad-
liberal.  He describes the technical component as ‘learning the tools of the trade.’  The 
theoretical component involves understanding the ‘how and why’ of the technical 
component.  Huntington (1959) considers the broad-liberal the most complex, yet critical 
component to expertise.  Professionals must understand their overall role in society in an 
economic, societal, political, and cultural context.  Members should be aware of the 
broader traditions of society as a whole and how their application of expertise must be 
utilized within strict standards of conduct and for the nation’s general welfare. 
The next characteristic Huntington (1959) identifies, professional responsibility, 
deals primarily with ethical behavior.  The professional may possess a skill that is not 
fully understood by the general populace; it may be difficult for the average citizen to 
know whether the professional is performing proficiently or behaving ethically.  The 
profession must police its own members and society must put a great deal of trust in the 
professional.  Huntington (1959) stipulates that this ‘client-professional’ relationship 
demands the client accept the professional’s expertise at face value, while the 
professional maintains absolute integrity.   
The final ingredient Huntington (1959) believes a profession must possess is 
corporateness.  Corporateness may best be described as cohesion, unity, and a ‘shared 
sense of belonging.’  This attribute may be the result of the bond that typically forms 
through the rigorous training necessary to attain professional status.  The ‘common bond 
of work,’ especially in the military context, has a powerful effect on cohesion.  Surviving 
hardship tends to build stronger relationships among members of a profession; war 
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creates the greatest hardship of all (Reardon, 1994).  The formation of professional 
organizations to communicate, share knowledge, and relate significant experiences often 
contributes to cohesion and provides an interface to the general populace.  Although 
somewhat dated, Huntington’s (1959) description of military professionalism is still 
pertinent today.  It is difficult to argue that expertise, responsibility, and corporateness are 
not desirable attributes for all Air Force members.  
Millett 
Dr. Allan Millett (1977) also determined that similar qualities define a military 
professional.  In the retired Marine colonel’s famous briefing at Ohio State University, 
Military Professionalism and Officership in America, he listed six attributes found in 
most professions.  Millett (1977) contends that a profession should:  be a full-time job, be 
a lifelong calling, control performance standards and recruitment, have a theoretical 
education, have standards and loyalty to client needs, and have autonomy granted by 
society.  According to Millett (1977), military organizations satisfy the requirements of 
professionalism if most or all of these attributes are present. 
Janowitz 
 Morris Janowitz (1960) took a slightly different approach when describing 
military professionalism.  In addition to recognizing certain key characteristics of 
professionalism, he also views military organizations and their members as extensions of 
society.  The need for strong institutional values and adherence to military tradition is 
downplayed.   Under this concept, military members more closely resemble the society 
from which they come.  This pragmatic approach requires ‘more flexibility in the beliefs 
and values’ of its members as their actions are determined by the immediate demands of 
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society and their behavior is primarily shaped by what is tolerated by the general 
populace.   
This convergent arrangement, which basically relies on a close blend of civil-
military relations, could theoretically have adverse consequences.  A military that isn’t 
adequately distinguished from the civilian populace may be unable to effectively perform 
due to unnecessary constraints and interference.  The American experience in Vietnam 
may demonstrate this situation (Cross, 2006; Henderson, Moskos, & National Defense 
University, 1985; Keegan, 1993).  Many senior military commanders blamed the 
excessive involvement and poor decision making of civilian leaders on the conflict’s 
unsatisfactory outcome (Henderson et al., 1985; King & Karabell, 2003).  In particular, 
civilian leaders selecting specific bombing targets and stipulating restrictive rules of 
engagement often placed them at odds with Air Force commanders and arguably reduced 
the effectiveness of the air campaign (Cross, 2006; Millett & Murray, 1987).   
The German and Japanese forces engaged during the Second World War may 
represent the other extreme of convergent civil-military arrangements.  Military 
organizations completely unencumbered by lucid civil authority or generally accepted 
standards of moral and ethical behavior can be quite successful in a military context, 
however, the consequences of this complete civil-military alliance can also be quite 
grave.  Military triumph can be difficult to sustain and regimes advocating unprovoked 
hostilities traditionally attract effective, unified opposition (Cross, 2006).  Undoubtedly, 
these circumstances contributed to the ultimate demise of Germany and Japan in WWII. 
While they certainly possessed highly professional armed forces by any definition; 
misguided leadership enabled through an ill advised civil-military arrangement, led them 
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down a path of destruction with dramatic consequences (Keegan, 1993).  Defeat 
transcended the battlefield and exacted a toll on the non-combatants within their societies 
much greater than would normally be expected or deemed acceptable by rational societies 
(Keegan, 2001; Keegan, 1993).    
Moskos’ Institutional-Occupational Model 
During the transition from a conscript military to an all volunteer force and in the 
wake of the Vietnam conflict, Moskos (1977) attempted to explain military 
professionalism in terms of organizational commitment and identification with traditional 
values.  Moskos’ (1977) I/O model refers to a number of levels of analysis to more fully 
define organizational professionalism.  On one level, he is speaking about shifts in 
individual attitudes and behaviors.  At another level, he is addressing changes within the 
social organization of the armed forces.  At a third level, he is interested in how broad 
historical and societal trends affect civil-military relations.  Together, these multiple 
levels interrelate to enhance the descriptive capacity of the I/O thesis (Moskos & Wood, 
1988). 
Moskos (1977) stressed the unique attributes of military service and advocated a 
reasonable separation between the military and general society.  This 
institutional/occupational I/O model assumes a continuum of civil-military arrangements 
ranging from a military entirely separate from society to one contiguous with civilian 
structures (Moskos, 1977).  “An institution is legitimized in terms of its value and norms 
that encourage individuals to transcend self-interest and sacrifice for the common good 
because of a deep rooted belief in the organization’s mission” (Moskos & Wood, 
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1988:5).  Members of an institutional organization would be characterized by a high level 
of commitment, strong service identification, and willingness to sacrifice with little 
regard for economic considerations.  Institutional members value intrinsic rewards and 
view the military as a “professional calling,” rather than a job.     
Occupational organizations on the other hand, would have members who focus on 
economic benefits and rewards, identify more with specific jobs or roles, and are less 
inclined to sacrifice for the common good.  Occupationally oriented members would 
primarily be interested in extrinsic, tangible motivational factors and would place little 
value on the concept of ‘service before self.’  Table 1 summarizes some of the 
fundamental differences between institutional and occupational characteristics. 
 
 
                         Table 1.  Institutional Versus Occupational Variables 
                                                                              (Moskos & Wood, 1988:16).    
   
Transformational Leadership 
The Air Force generally advocates inspirational leadership over strict 
management practices to achieve organizational goals (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  A 
leadership theory that closely resembles the I/O model involves transformational versus 




they originally intended and often more that they ever thought possible (Bass, 1985; Deci 
& Ryan, 1985).  Transformational leadership stresses intrinsic rewards; it builds personal 
and social identification among its members with the mission and goals of the leader and 
organization.   
Transactional leadership on the other hand, emphasizes extrinsic rewards; it relies 
on the transaction or exchange that occurs among leaders and followers.  The exchange is 
based on conditions and rewards and what will be received if extrinsic requirements are 
fulfilled (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Cameron, Pierce, & Ebrary, 2002).  An occupational 
military would be dominated by transactional leadership while an institutional military 
would be more closely aligned with a transformational style.  In a military context, 
experience would indicate that effective leadership cannot thrive in a purely occupational 
environment (Bonen, 1982; Moskos & Wood, 1988; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002).  A 
transformational leadership style emphasizing institutional values has shown to be more 
predictive of organizational performance (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Bass, Jung, Avolio, & 
Berson, 2003). 
Of course, the conflicting mindsets of institutionalism and occupationalism are at 
the extreme ends of the spectrum.  While a purely institutional atmosphere may seem 
ideal for a military organization, according to Moskos (1977) it isn’t realistically 
possible.  He contends that both conditions co-exist within the military, but the mix 
should lean toward the institutional side for optimal effectiveness.  Moskos (1977) 
explains the danger in placing too much reliance on occupational motivators to perform a 
military mission is that these purely extrinsic rewards may create behavior that will not 
be performed in the future except for even greater extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards, 
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moreover, can weaken intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1973; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Mastroianni, 2006; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002).   
In the extreme, this could mean that a military member expecting monetary 
reward for performing a critical task might be reluctant to perform that task if those 
extrinsic incentives are reduced or eliminated.  Perhaps even worse, according to 
cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), once an extrinsic reward is provided, it 
may significantly reduce the motivation or intrinsic reward previously enjoyed by the 
individual (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989; Mastroianni, 2006; Sivasubramaniam et al., 
2002). 
An Occupational Shift 
 Some researchers have suggested that a gradual shift toward occupationalism as 
predicted by Moskos (1977) and as measured by several researchers (Daskevich & 
Nafziger, 1980; Cotton, 1983; Stahl et al., 1978) could lead to over-identification with the 
civilian sector, possibly affecting senior military leader’s decision making (Bonen, 1982; 
Carroll, 2003; Snider & Carlton-Carew, 1995). If military leadership eventually functions 
and thinks like the larger society, decisions requiring a uniquely military point of view 
may be increasingly difficult to make, as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam may so aptly 
illustrate.  A compromised military could result in a weakening of U.S. prestige and 
marked deterioration in the ability to defend vital national interests. 
Moskos (1977) and a number of other experts on military affairs (Wood; 1988; 
Smith, 1998; Snider, 2003; Thomas, 2004) are concerned that the overall trend the past 
few decades is towards a more occupationally centered military.  While this may merely 
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reflect societal fluctuations, the implications for national defense are serious.  Moskos 
and Wood (1988) believe the results of ‘creeping occupationalism’ will have a negative 
impact on military effectiveness.  They identified three key areas—mission performance, 
member motivation, and professional responsibility—that are at particular risk from the 
occupational outlook. 
Effective organizational performance benefits from having motivated, enthusiastic 
individuals willing to sacrifice personal comfort or ambition for mission accomplishment 
(Butler, Lardent, & Miner, 1983; Cantrell & Andrews, 1993; Moskos, 2001).  Members 
motivated by institutional values based on intrinsic factors may posses a greater level of 
commitment and perform at a higher level when compared to individuals motivated 
primarily by occupational factors (Bass & Riggio, 2006).  Occupationalism may set 
boundaries on performance based on economic considerations and actually attenuate an 
individual’s true capability (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lee, 2005).  Moskos and Wood (1988:5) 
state that, “An effective manager in an occupation prevails on workers to do what they 
are supposed to do; an effective leader in an institution motivates members to do more 
than they are supposed to do.”  If members only complete tasks within quantifiable 
measures, the removal of the extrinsic reward may result in those with strong 
occupational tendencies to not perform at all (Moskos & Chambers, 1993; Shields & 
Hofer, 1988; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2002; Thomas, 2004). 
   The final consequence of excessive occupationalism is potentially the most 
damaging and the major focus of this paper—the undermining of military 
professionalism.  If one accepts the military as a profession, then the I/O model provides 
a way to predict the military’s future based on traditional measures of effectiveness 
 
 28
(Moskos & Wood, 1988).  Moskos & Wood (1988:5) observe that, “If military functions 
can be reduced to dollars, then ultimate decisions on the military organization and 
military personnel become the province of cost-benefit analysis; decisions are removed 
from the military professional.”  On the other hand, an institutional affiliation 
acknowledges the military as a unique organization deserving of the public trust and 
capable of fulfilling the unparalleled responsibility of national defense.  Members are 
viewed as ‘exceptional individuals’ ready and willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for 
the common good.  It may be difficult to assign a price tag to the level of commitment 
required to serve in this capacity. 
It is interesting to note that several historians (Bury, 1923; Gibbon, Bury & 
Piranesi, 1946; Heather, 2005) attribute the fall of the Roman Empire not only to general 
societal decay, but also to its influence on the enthusiasm of the average citizen to serve 
in the military.  The professional ‘citizen-soldier’ of the empire’s glory days, was 
gradually supplanted by indifferent mercenaries or those citizens motivated solely by 
personal gain.  The empire had to begin hiring soldiers recruited from the unemployed 
city mobs or worse from foreign countries or conquered provinces.  This weakened the 
military organization and created a vicious cycle whereby defeats in foreign lands and 
increasing domestic strife further contributed to indifference for military service.  
Frustrated Romans lost their desire to defend the Empire and became increasingly 
apathetic toward military service. Thus, the army not only proved unreliable on the 
battlefield, it was also very expensive to create and maintain (Heather, 2005).   
Considering that the U.S. military is currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and global terrorism remains a constant threat, the personal risks faced by service 
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members are as tangible as ever.  A trend toward occupationalism could prove even more 
detrimental in times of war than in times of relative peace.  Military members losing their 
motivation to perform due to a perceived imbalance between the level of danger and 
monetary incentive could have a very real effect on readiness and mission 
accomplishment (Rangel, Bandow, Moskos, & Scales, 2004; D. M. Snider & Carlton-
Carew, 1995; Sorensen, 1994). 
Despite the suggested decline of institutional values among Air Force officers 
(Moskos, 1977; Cotton, 1983; Snider, 2003), the service has generally continued to meet 
mission requirements in recent conflicts.  This military effectiveness seems somewhat 
contradictory considering the notion that officer professionalism is in a gradual state of 
decay (Moskos, 1977).  Perhaps there is a stabilizing influence that has counteracted this 
seemingly harmful trend.  Considering the typical hierarchical pyramid structure of the 
Air Force, a large proportion of AF members are supervised by NCOs at lower levels, 
thus emphasizing the important role of the NCOs as leaders.  NCOs are typically in the 
best position to create enthusiasm for organizational objectives and to motivate 
performance at the operational level.  It is the NCOs’ responsibility to transform orders 
from above into operational tasks that support mission accomplishment.  A professional 
NCO corps helps ensure the directions of senior commanders are fulfilled at the lowest 
levels.  While wars and battles can be won by luck, superior tactics, or even divine 
intervention, it is reasonable to expect the outcome between evenly matched forces to be 
decided by the professionalism and commitment of the individual soldiers (Cross, 2006; 




The past few centuries have yielded incredible advances in civilization and 
technology that have served to ‘shrink’ our world as never before.  Modern 
communication infrastructures enable an almost unimaginable level of interconnectivity 
spanning all nations motivating trade and commerce on a truly global scale.  Perhaps 
counterintuitive to this level of unprecedented cooperation, the destruction and death 
wrought by warfare remains a reality all modern societies are forced to acknowledge.  
Nations continue to maintain significant military forces, not only for security purposes, 
but also to further political interests on the world stage; the United States is no exception. 
Good leaders are people who have a passion to 
succeed.  To become successful leaders, we must 
first learn that no matter how good the technology 
or how shiny the equipment, people-to-people 
relations get things done in our organizations.  
People are the assests that determine our success or 
failure.  If you are to be a good leader, you have to 
cultivate your skills in the arena personal relations 
(Fogleman, 1995). 
 
To help support these national security interests, the Air Force is in the process of 
a force transformation where leaders have indicated a need to reduce manpower to pay 
for upgrades to aging weapon systems. This effort has initiated a significant downsizing 
in personnel in exchange for cutting edge technology. This latest strategic focus on 
technology intended to better equip personnel for future engagements, may also have 
subtle unintended consequences on Air Force culture. Technology alone rarely 
guarantees success in conflict; even the greatest innovations are useless without dedicated 
and professional individuals willing to sacrifice everything to accomplish organizational 
objectives (Reardon, 1994). Air Force leaders are imbued with the notion that "our people 
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are our most valuable resource," and consequently, they want personnel who are 
committed to the Air Force and are motivated intrinsically by the core values and a strong 
desire to serve their country.  
   




































IV. Thesis Argument 
NCO Institutionalism 
A sense of institutional dedication is important for all members of a military 
organization (Carroll, 2003; Ginsburgh, 1964).  Commissioned officers, non-
commissioned officers (NCOs), and airman alike, should adhere to the same standards of 
conduct and commitment that enhance military effectiveness as stipulated by AF Core 
Values (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).   
If you would be successful in our profession in the United 
States Air Force, then take your lead from those who have 
gone before.  Make unflinching honesty and integrity the 
hallmarks of your performance.  Aggressively pursue 
excellence in all you do.  And place Service before self 
(Fogleman, 1996) 
 
If the only thing that distinguished Air Force members from their civilian 
counterparts was a uniform, then there would be no need for elaborate rules, regulations, 
standards of conduct, customs and courtesies, etc., that exist within the service (Davis, & 
Donnini, 1991).  In particular, standards of conduct, moral principles, and the concept of 
unhesitating self-sacrifice distinguish Air Force members from the general populace 
(Fogleman, 1995).  The adherence to and enforcement of these various standards is 
integral to mission accomplishment (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  
NCOs occupy a unique position in the hierarchical military rank structure 
between the officer corps and the enlisted airmen.  NCOs must accept and execute all 
duties, instructions, responsibilities, and lawful orders in a timely, efficient manner; lead 
subordinates and exercise effective followership in mission accomplishment; and place 
the requirements of their official duties and responsibilities ahead of their personal 
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desires (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  When new recruits enter the service, it is incumbent 
on NCOs to properly indoctrinate them into the organization.  NCO leadership and the 
sharing of general knowledge are crucial to ensure new members are effectively 
integrated into the service.  It is also during the early stages of development that airman 
must understand and adhere to many rules and regulations that define acceptable conduct 
within the Air Force.   
If NCOs allow new members to discount traditional military values or standards 
of conduct in favor of societal norms, then the institutional foundation will be weakened 
and acceptable principles of behavior gradually modified to reflect general culture 
(Moore, 1998).  In a Utopian society, this may not create a problem, but in the absence of 
such, the consequences could be detrimental to good order and discipline and ultimately 
affect mission accomplishment.  NCOs are the first line supervisors expected to maintain 
traditional Air Force culture and encourage professional behavior through the 
enforcement of various standards of conduct.  
NCOs must adhere to Air Force core values at all times and serve as role models 
for more junior NCOs and airman.  As the front line supervisors for new recruits, NCOs 
and are in the best position to shape behavior and instill the institutional values necessary 
to perform in the AF.  Conversely, NCOs who don’t epitomize recognized standards of 
conduct and behavior may adversely affect a new recruit’s perspective on the AF.  This 
may create a vicious cycle whereby generations of recruits, improperly indoctrinated, 
continue this negative trend when thrust into supervisory positions.  The responsibility 
for instilling the proper military virtues into airman may be the most important function 
performed by NCOs at all levels of leadership. 
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NCOs are primarily responsible for leading and managing teams to complete 
mission requirements.  NCOs must be technical experts and well as effective leaders, 
mangers, and mentors.  This becomes more apparent as NCOs progress through the 
enlisted ranks.  As rank increases, responsibility and span of control also increase 
requiring greater reliance on more junior NCOs to accomplish routine activities and 
perform direct leadership roles.  Senior NCOs, particularly those filling group level or 
higher positions, often direct and manage a significant amount of personnel and material 
resources.  While always subordinate in rank to any officer, the functions accomplished 
by some senior ranking NCOs may rival that of many officer positions.  Conceivably, 
performing duties at higher levels of the military hierarchy may align senior NCOs more 
closely with the officer corps than with the typical body of NCOs. 
NCOs are involved in the entire life cycle of a military member’s development, 
from officer and enlisted recruitment, enlisted basic military training, and technical 
school instruction for enlisted members.  NCOs conduct frequent on-the-job-training 
sessions and interact with airmen on a daily basis.  Officers typically have infrequent 
contact with airman and normally interact with senior NCOs as the chain of command 
dictates.  NCOs must maintain loyalty to the officers appointed above them and the 
airman they supervise.  They must follow lawful, reasonable orders without hesitation or 
complaint to preserve the integrity of the chain of command.  If junior members perceive 
that an NCO disagrees with an officer’s orders or if NCOs openly criticize an officer’s 
decision-making ability, the results on organizational cohesion and effectiveness can be 
detrimental (Millett & Murray, 1987).   
The NCO corps is not an entry level position.  NCOs must earn their position 
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through a gradual process involving promotion and time in service.  For this reason, the 
NCO corps may represent the traditional corporate superlative of ‘climbing the ladder’ or 
‘paying one’s dues’ in a military context.  Having emerged from the trenches, NCOs may 
gain a greater appreciation or level of empathy for the plight of subordinates than would 
otherwise be possible; it has been suggested by some that the ‘best’ officers are prior 
enlisted. 
NCOs may conceivably impart a stabilizing influence on the AF as the 
institutionalism among the officer corps gradually decays (Moskos & Wood, 1988; 
Moskos, 1977; Snider et al., 1999).  A cohesive NCO corps may provide a sturdy 
foundation on which operational concepts are translated into actual mission performance 
despite a more occupationally oriented officer corps.  The average airman may interact 
more with and be influenced to a greater extent by their immediate NCO supervisors than 
by officers at higher levels and thus perform the mission without compromise.  The 
officer corps, while issuing directives, may indirectly rely upon on this institutional 
“buffer” NCOs provide for the performance of tasks at the operational level. 
A study (see table 2 below) conducted in 1978 among Air Force personnel 
suggests that senior NCOs are considerably more institutional than junior enlisted, while 
senior officers were only slightly more institutional compared to junior officers (Stahl et 
al., 1978).  However, the most interesting thing to note may be the difference in increase 
in institutionalism between junior/senior officers and enlisted.  While the officer mean 
increases by 1.01, the enlisted mean increases by more than twice that rate at 2.44.  
Figure 1 illustrates the difference in the rates of institutionalism as rank increases for both 
officers and enlisted.  The greater slope of the enlisted line suggests that some aspect of 
 
the enlisted career experience enhances intuitionalism at a more significant rate than for 
officers. 
Table 2.  Multivariate Tests (Hotelling's T2) for Institution and Occupation Measures 
Group n Institution Occupation Fa Eta2
Senior Sergeants 3,022 17.37 11.92 
Junior Enlisted 2,806 14.93 12.83 331.42 10.90 
Senior Officers 2,550 16.21 11.42 
Junior Officers 2,163 15.20 12.43 92.20 4.00 
Regular Commission 2,950 15.68 11.98 
Reserve Commission 1,835 15.13 12.34 20.69 0.90 
Doctorate Degree 348 15.02 12.92 
Other Education 10,339 15.50 12.51 6.70 0.10 
Physicians 111 15.03 13.00 
Others 10,576 15.50 12.52 4.81 0.10 
a F(2, ∞ )  = 4.61, p = .01          
Distributions of Institution-Occupation Measures                                          Note:  N = 10,687 
Measure Range M Mdn SD   
Institution 4 - 24 15.83 15.49 3.56   
Occupation 4 - 20 12.52 12.41 2.98   
         (Stahl et al., 1978) 






















Institutionalism among NCOs may be strongly influenced by an indoctrination 
process consisting of continuous enlisted profession military education (PME) and 
incentivised through the enlisted promotion system (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  NCO 
PME begins with basic military training which involves intensive indoctrination and 
familiarization with fundamental principles of military service emphasizing AF doctrine, 
tradition, and standards of conduct (AFPAM36-2241V2, 2005).  The basic enlisted PME 
philosophy demands all members to attend in residence programs, with successful 
completion a mandatory requirement to assume the ranks of E-5, E-7, and E-9 
respectively.  The typical enlisted PME timeline is as follows:  senior airmen with 
approximately 3-4 years time in service (TIS) attend airman leadership school; technical 
sergeants with 7-12 years TIS attend the NCO academy, and master/senior master 
sergeants with anything from 15-22 years TIS attend the senior NCO academy (SNCOA).  
The SNCOA can be completed via correspondence; however, in-residence attendance is 
still required for promotion to E-9.  There can be quite a gap between programs, and the 
majority of NCOs will never attend the SNCOA due to rank restrictions.  In fact, 
discounting BMT, most NCOs will only complete two in-resident PME programs during 
a twenty year career.  Despite any lack of frequency in the formal PME program, NCOs 
must maintain a working knowledge of AF doctrine and regulations to perform mission 
requirements and properly train subordinates on a daily basis.  NCOs are often relied 
upon by superiors and subordinates alike to interpret and enact AF doctrine, customs and 




The Air Force officer corps is also subjected to initial indoctrinization in the 
various commissioning programs and basic training.  Each commissioning source (OTS, 
ROTC, and USAFA) has an individual BMT program, while the Air and Space Basic 
Course (ASBC) is the first officer PME attended by all.  A general timeline for 
subsequent officer PME programs is as follows:  squadron officer school (SOS) at 4-7 
years TIS, air command and staff college (ACSC) at 12-14 years TIS, and air war college 
(AWC) at 17-21 years TIS.   SOS, ACSC, and AWC can be completed via 
correspondence, but in-residence completion is more highly regarded.  As with enlisted 
PME, there can be a significant gap between programs, and quite possibly, an officer 
could attend only one in-residence program (ASBC) during a twenty year career.  As 
formal indoctrinization significantly tapers off, the study of AF doctrine, traditions, and 
standards of conduct increasingly relies on the individual initiative of officers to maintain 
knowledge on these subjects (Davis & Donnini, 1991).   
The Profession of Arms 
Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure 
knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that 
if you lose, the nation will be destroyed, that the very 
obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, 
country (MacArthur, 1950). 
 
The profession of arms is still an important concept and a primary focus of Air 
Force PME; some attempt is still made to instill a ‘warrior spirit’ in all airmen, despite 
the lack of a real combat mission for most AF specialties.  Both officer and enlisted PME 
begins with some type of basic military training (BMT) program designed to provide 
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initial indoctrination into the military lifestyle while providing instruction and training in 
basic concepts necessary to perform in a military environment.  Subsequent officer and 
enlisted PME curricula are not substantially different, focusing primarily on 
professionalism, leadership, and management.  Whether or not AF PME programs 
receive adequate attention and support from the highest levels of leadership, and whether 
or not attendees take it seriously has been a source of controversy and discussion for 
decades (Mosier, 1988; Ullman, 1990).  Despite any perceived lack of legitimacy or 
enthusiasm, PME can be considered the primary source for teaching the traditional 
military values and ideal standards of conduct and behavior that promote institutionalism 
(Mosier, 1988).  It seems reasonable to assume that the longer an individual remains in 
service, the more PME will be completed, and theoretically, the more institutionalized the 
member will become.  While the substance and frequency of PME programs may not 
differ significantly, one factor may differentiate enlisted from officer PME and have an 
appreciable impact on its effectiveness—the relationship between enlisted PME and 
promotion. 
Enlisted Promotion System 
In conjunction with PME, the enlisted promotion system may also encourage 
NCOs to attain an even more detailed level of general military knowledge in order to earn 
higher rank.  The enlisted system relies on certain objective measures in the form aptitude 
tests, decoration points, and enlisted performance report (EPR) points (see appendices C 
and E).  Enlisted members competing for promotion in the ranks of staff sergeant – 
master sergeant must take two written tests designed to measure job proficiency and 
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general AF knowledge.  The specialty knowledge test (SKT) is air force specialty code 
(AFSC) specific and includes 100 multiple choice questions geared toward measuring an 
individual’s job proficiency.  The professional fitness examination (PFE) is also a 100 
question multiple choice test, but it is based on AFPAM36-2241, and entails general Air 
Force knowledge and military subjects (see appendix F).  NCOs who score poorly on 
enlisted promotion tests are at a great disadvantage when compared to peers who score 
well.  In addition to any intrinsic motivational factors, the obvious advantage of 
possessing a comprehensive understanding of AF doctrine, traditions, regulations and 
standards of conduct, motivates NCOs to devote a significant amount of effort preparing 
for the PFE.  The extensive knowledge of general AF functions gained through this 
preparation, is not only necessary to attain higher rank, but also enables NCOs to 
adequately perform fundamental tasks and may contribute to an overall sense of ‘well-
being.’ 
Officer Promotion System 
 The officer promotion process is based almost purely on job performance, which 
may indirectly involve a subjective evaluation of professionalism, but lacks any objective 
criteria related to knowledge of or appreciation for Air Force doctrine, tradition, and 
standards of conduct (Davis & Donnini, 1991).  Officer promotions are based more on 
intangible factors such as experience, location, and perceived level of responsibility and 
less on actual doctrinal or specialty knowledge when compared to enlisted standards.  An 
officer can attain higher rank based almost exclusively on documented duty performance 
absent any formal testing procedure to measure general AF knowledge.  The subjective 
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opinion of the officer’s rater is the primary criteria for success and subsequent 
advancement.  Officers receive a written officer performance report (OPR) designed to 
document performance and behavior while engaged in official military duties (see 
appendix D).  The reports are ideally written by superiors with first-hand knowledge of 
the member’s accomplishments and basically involve a “does/does not meet standards” 
rating system. 
For promotion recommendation, officers are rated as “definitely promote,” 
“promote,” and “do not promote.”  Such a general rating system may make preparing an 
OPR on several officers possessing similar skills and performing similar duties an 
extremely arduous process.  Differentiating those officers truly worthy of promotion may 
be inherently difficult using subjective comments that will ultimately be judged by a 
promotion board with no direct knowledge of the promotion candidate’s actual 
performance. 
Impact on Professionalism 
The enlisted and officer promotion systems are drastically different.  Officer 
promotions are based almost completely on written subjective performance reports (see 
appendix B), while enlisted promotions are based on a number of quantitative and 
qualitative factors (See appendix C).  Though subjective criteria increases via a board 
system for the highest enlisted ranks, members still must take a written supervisory and 
knowledge exam (USAFE) which is basically a more in-depth PFE.  The enlisted system 
provides a more systematic approach for determining promotions than the officer system.  
Perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of written examinations not only lessens the 
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dependence on purely subjective criteria found in the officer promotion system, it may 
result in greater motivation for enlisted members to master specialty and general AF 
knowledge, thus increasing professionalism and commitment.  
The enlisted promotion system may actually reinforce the PME curriculum by 
requiring members to focus on subjects related to military professionalism even during 
significant gaps in formal training.  NCOs competing for promotion may be motivated to 
maintain a higher level of knowledge on subjects directly relating to traditional military 
functions than would otherwise be expected.  Basic expectancy theory dictates that 
behavior is typically targeted toward actions that offer the greatest reward (Vroom, 
1964).   
It seems reasonable to expect most enlisted AF members desire a promotion, 
therefore the expectation that studying the PFE/USAFE will lead to greater rewards may 
motivate behavior while increasing institutionalism.  The constant exposure to the ‘ideal’ 
standards of conduct and behavior initially taught in PME and reinforced through the 
promotion system may result in an internalization of these characteristics.  Consequently, 
an individual attaining SNCO rank would not only be an ‘expert’ on the AF by virtue of 
repeatedly studying for promotion, but also be enamored with the traditional military 
values and beliefs most closely associated with institutionalism.  This would certainly 
help explain the results of Stahl’s (1977) research which indicate enlisted institutionalism 
increases over time at a much greater rate compared to officers.  Since an officer’s level 
of professionalism seems to require more self-initiative regarding general AF knowledge 
and traditions, and considering the reported increase in occupationalism among officers, 
it isn’t unreasonable to expect differences in their respective level of institutionalism 
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compared to NCOs. 
Research Question and Propositions 
Therefore, this study introduces the following research question and propositions. 
Q1.  Is professionalism consistent among Air Force members? 
P1:  Rank is related to level of professionalism, suggesting that enlisted NCOs in 
general will have a greater level of professionalism than commissioned officers in the 
context of the Moskos (1977) I/O framework. 
P2:  Officer and enlisted PME programs influence institutional values (i.e. 
professionalism), suggesting that the enlisted PME program, by virtue of its relationship 
to the promotion system, is more influential for professionalism than the officer PME 
program  
Summary 
Many theories have been developed and numerous research efforts have been 
conducted in an effort to rationalize professionalism within the military.  Despite ongoing 
research efforts (Daskevich & Nafziger, 1980; Moskos & Wood, 1988; Smith, 1998), 
none of the previous studies have considered the specific differences between 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers using the I/O model.  Considering the vast 
majority of AF members are enlisted, as the following table illustrates, the limited focus 
of these studies may provide an incomplete picture of the actual level of professionalism 




Rank Number Percent of AF 
Airmen ( E1-E4) 119,204 35% 
NCOs (E5-E9) 151,084 45% 
Officers (O1-O6) 68,687 20% 
Total 338,975 100% 
     Table 3.  AF Officer and Enlisted Assigned    
               (AFPC, Feb 2007; http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/vbin) 
 
A broader study encompassing officers and NCOs may provide a much more 
accurate assessment of the overall level of professionalism in the Air Force.  A 
questionnaire developed through a compilation of items used on previous studies by Stahl 
(1977), Cotton (1983), and Wood (1988) may provide a more comprehensive measure of 
I/O attitudes within the service (see appendix A).  Such a widespread study of military 
professionalism would help alleviate the historical research gap by applying the I/O 
measure to both AF officers and NCOs simultaneously.  Significant findings may suggest 
the existing PME and promotion programs require modification to help foster 















As early as 1960 in his book, The Professional Soldier:  A Social and Political 
Portrait, Janowitz concluded the following after interviewing 113 military officers,  
 “Those who see the military profession as a calling or a 
unique profession are outnumbered by a greater 
concentration of individuals for whom the military is just 
another job…For a sizable majority—no motive for joining 
the military could be discerned, except that the military was 
a job” (Janowitz, 1960: 117). 
 
Based on subsequent work by Moskos (1977) and other military sociologists, this trend 
has continued.  If anything, the factors that may foster occupational tendencies are 
arguably stronger in today’s AF than ever before.  The services reliance on high 
technology, specialization, monetary incentives, academic versus military instruction, and 
the desire to duplicate a corporate structure may all further contribute to institutional 
decline.  Although NCOs aren’t totally immune, officers may be more susceptible to 
occupational influences (Smith, 1998).   
If there is an appreciable difference between the level of professionalism among 
officers and NCOs in the context of Moskos’ institutional/occupational (I/O) model, a 
reasonable explanation should exist.  Rank is the most obvious distinction between 
officers and NCOs, but whether or not superior rank imparts a greater level of 
professionalism is less obvious.  AF recruits qualify for various commissioning programs 
by virtue of education completed.  High school grads with no additional education qualify 
for the enlisted force, while applicants possessing a bachelor’s degree or higher may 
apply for the officer corps.  Education aside, potential applicants for either track must be 
of high moral character and be physically and mentally qualified for military service.  
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Interestingly enough, while education level plays a prominent role in acceptance and 
commissioning program, the curriculum does not.  Perhaps most significant for the 
officer corps, a degree related to the conduct of war, such as national security, strategic 
studies, military theory, or military history, is not required.  In fact, the number of 
officers who have specialized in these subjects is much smaller than their intrinsic value 
would suggest (van Creveld, 1990).     
The AF basically owes its very existence to advanced technology.  As 
‘deterrence’ strategy came into vogue in response to the emerging Soviet threat after 
WWII, the AF was the only service that could reliably deliver ‘the bomb’ (Cross, 2006).  
The enormous leverage this created allowed the AF to finally break way from the Army 
and become a separate service.  The AF has never forgotten its roots and the pursuit of 
advanced technology has gone unabated in the intervening years.  While understandable, 
this single-minded focus may have come at the expense of traditional military standards 
and institutional values.   
As technology increases our reliance on technology increases as well, requiring 
specially trained personnel who can operate and maintain a plethora of unique systems.  
Such specialization eventually leads to the development of fractions or subcultures whose 
members substitute a shared vision and sense of mission for identification with their 
immediate specialty (Smith, 1998). Air Force leaders have already recognized the 
problems associated with the stove pipe culture, and have implemented programs (e.g. 
Project Warrior, Developing Aerospace Leaders, etc.) intended to break down the barriers 
and integrate career fields in order to emphasize a shared vision and sense of mission. 
Despite noble intentions, many of these initiatives may not focus on the most 
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suitable areas.  For example, attempts to create a more corporate structure in the AF may 
actually contribute to occupationalism.  Initiatives such as Management by Objective, 
Quality Air Force, and most recently, Lean, tend to de-emphasize traditional standards of 
military conduct in favor of efficiency.  “…These disruptive impacts are becoming 
increasingly visible and call into question the practice of uncritically applying civilian 
managerial techniques to military systems:  organizational effectiveness and combat 
effectiveness are not the same thing” (Cotton, 1983: 47).  While logical pursuits, the AF 
may never be comparable to a civilian corporation; its bureaucratic nature may actually 
be a benefit in times of war and help preserve institutional values (Wilson, 1989). 
Perhaps the best way to counteract the occupational trend is through an effective 
PME program.  PME may best serve to unite all AF members toward a common goal and 
help foster a unified sense of purpose.  PME may be the preeminent source of military 
professionalism and the ideal method to preserve institutional values.  Although 
sociologists have largely ignored the enlisted force when measuring professionalism, it is 
possible that the enlisted force, in particular NCOs, may actually be more professional 
than officers in the context of Moskos’ I/O model due in part to a more effective PME 
program.  Considering significant differences in the enlisted PME and promotion process 
(e.g. PFE), both of which may be more effective at encouraging traditional military 
values, the enlisted force may be less affected by trends toward occupationalism.  PME 
continually reinforced through the promotion system, may help explain Stahl’s (1978) 
research which indicated enlisted members experience a greater rate increase in 
institutionalism over time when compared to officers. 
Although some sociologists interpreted Moskos’ original argument in absolute 
 
terms as depicted in figure 2 below, he never intended the I/O model as a ‘zero-sum’ 
analogy.  Rather, he was quick to point out that institutional and occupational tendencies 
are present in the military simultaneously, and as Stahl’s (1978) research indicated, even 




Figure 2. A Literal Interpretation of Moskos’ I/O Model 
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As figure 2 suggests, an individual may possess various levels of institutional and/or 
occupation characteristics.  It is conceivable that excessive occupationalism may not be 
the most detrimental condition facing the service; rather a lack of institutionalism may be 
the most damaging situation.  Individuals who fall in quadrants I and III may be equally 
ideal, while quadrants II and IV represent careerists with little or no regard for 
organizational concerns.  The obvious goal would be for the majority of AF members, 
regardless of rank, to fall in quadrant III.  Although this may be an ideal target, in reality, 
many personnel are less committed by intrinsic rewards and may require motivation via 
extrinsic factors, such as technical training, educational opportunities, enlistment 
bonuses, retirement benefits, and other monetary compensation packages.  
However, if military members become completely devoid of institutional values 
and identify exclusively with their respective occupations and extrinsic rewards, their 
reactions during conflict may be unpredictable at best.  As the U.S. military’s 
involvement in the Middle East continues, low level, high intensity conflict may be the 
focus of military operations for the foreseeable future.  As the Khobar Towers attack so 
poignantly illustrated, such operations are typically unpredictable in nature with 
asymmetric attack and indistinct battle lines the norm. The prospect of such erratic 
violence may motivate increasing numbers of extrinsically motivated AF members to opt 
for comparable civilian occupations.  Perhaps they will join the growing number of 
civilian contractors on which services rely to perform increasingly complex support 
functions.  An AF composed of a greater proportion of occupationally motivated service 
members and civilian contractors may not perform effectively during wartime operations.  
What amount of compensation will be necessary to motivate such a force when faced 
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with the reality of the ‘unlimited liability’ clause?  
Perhaps such a reckoning won’t be necessary at all.  The AF has long been forced 
to share the mantle of nuclear deterrence and is finding it increasingly difficult to 
differentiate itself from the other services.  All branches have aerial components, while 
the AF lacks any naval forces or appreciable ground combat units.  Even the most sacred 
AF specialty of all, the combat pilot, may eventually be supplanted by the unmanned 
aerial vehicle operated by a civilian, geographically separated from the front.   
The AF is working to become the lead service in the ‘space’ and ‘cyberspace’ 
mission in an attempt to regain the ‘technical leverage’ enjoyed in the past.  However, 
such a strategy entails cutting various personnel programs, including PME, to 
accommodate escalating costs.  It is possible that this renewed focus on technical 
superiority, successful or not, may only contribute to the spread of occupationalism and 
further diminish institutional values and cohesion.  Perhaps in the most ironic outcome of 
all, the very technology that enabled the AF to gain independence in the first place, may 
ultimately be the most rational argument for it to revert to a mere support role. 
Conclusion 
Despite a lack of recent empirical data, this study has attempted to analyze the 
difference in levels of professionalism between officers and NCOs in an 
institutional/occupation context and to offer some possible explanations.  While 
differences in professionalism may exist, the most important consideration may actually 
be the precarious balancing act between technological expertise and traditional military 
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values all AF members must contend with.  PME may be the single greatest source of 
institutional values that military members have at their disposal and therefore provide the 
best chance for members to overcome the ‘professional-technical’ (I/O) paradigm.  
Enlisted professionalism may be significantly enhanced through the interaction of the 
enlisted PME and promotion systems; more research devoted to measuring AF 
professionalism—in all ranks, may provide a more accurate assessment than previous 
efforts.  Professionalism shouldn’t be considered only in the realm of officership—it 
should be a priority for all AF members. 
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Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire 
 
Privacy Notice 
The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:  
Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to measure attitudes and behaviors that influence 
Air Force culture. 
Participation: There are no anticipated risks associated with participation.  Your 
participation is completely voluntary and there is no penalty for non-participation.  You 
do not have to answer any question(s) that you do not wish to answer.  However, please 
consider that the greater the participation, the more insightful and useful the data will be 
for researchers.  
Anonymity:  We greatly appreciate your participation.  All of your responses and 
information provided in this survey are confidential and completely anonymous.  No 
personal information will be collected.  A limited amount of demographic information 
will be collected to provide a sample description. 
 
Instructions 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE SHOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES TO 
COMPLETE. NO DATA IS ENTERED INTO THE DATABASE UNTIL THE 
FINISH BUTTON IS SELECTED. 
 
• There are no right or wrong answers, so don’t dwell on any one question—just 
answer honestly what first comes to mind.  
• Please do not discuss your answers with other participants—your responses 
should be independent.  We don’t want your opinions and responses to influence 
other participants. 
• Please select the next tab to start the survey. 
 
I have read the procedures above and voluntarily agree to participate in this survey. 
Yes   No 
 
Contact information: 
If you have any questions or comments about the survey please contact MSgt Edward K. 







Please indicate your level of agreement to the questions below by recording your 
responses using the following scale: 
1-Strongly Disagree; 2-Disagree; 3-Neither Agree/Disagree; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree 
 
1. If I left the Air Force tomorrow, I think it would be very difficult to get a job in 
private industry with pay, benefits, duties, and responsibilities comparable with those 
of my present job.  
     1       2  3  4  5 
 
2. An Air Force base is a desirable place to live.  
 
     1       2  3  4  5 
 
3. The Air Force requires me to participate in too many activities that are not related to 
my job.  
      1       2        3        4       5 
 
4. Air Force members should take more interest in mission accomplishment and less 
interest in their personal concerns.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5. I wish that more Air Force members had a genuine concern for national security.   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
6. Discipline in today’s Air Force is too lenient.   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7. More supervision of member performance and behavior is needed at lower levels 
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within the Air Force.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8. An individual can get more of an even break in civilian life than in the Air Force. 
 
      1        2        3       4      5 
 
9. No one should feel compelled to accept an assignment he or she does not want.  
        1                     2        3       4      5 
 
10. Military personnel should perform their operational duties regardless of the personal 
and family consequences.   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
11. Personal interests and wishes must take second place to operational requirements for 
military personnel.   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
12. What a member of the armed forces does in his or her off-duty hours is none of the 
military’s business.   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
13. Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
14. What a member does in his or her private life should be of no concern of his or her 
supervisor or commander.  




15. Compensation should be based primarily on one’s merit and not on rank and 
seniority.  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
16. Compensation should be based primarily on one’s technical skill level and not on 
rank and seniority.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
17. Bonuses and off-scale pay should be directed toward military specialties where there 
are manpower shortages.   
1  2  3  4  5 
 
18. Military members with specialties that require advanced training or a high level of 
technical skill should be paid more than their counterparts of the same rank.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
19. I normally think of myself as a specialist working for the military rather than as a 
military member.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
20. Holding all economic considerations to the side, I would prefer to live in base 
housing.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
21. Military personnel should be able to live off base or on base as they prefer. 
   
1  2  3  4  5 
22. The spouse of a military member ought to feel as much a part of the military 
community as the military member.  




23. I would prefer that the dollar value of military “benefits” be added to my pay and the 
“benefits” dropped.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
24. Military personnel who commit crimes off duty and off post should be tried by a 
military court martial rather than by civilian courts.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
25. If I suddenly became rich (due to an inheritance, lottery winning, etc.), I would 
continue my military career until retirement.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
26. Service members need some kind of an association (not a union) to represent their 
views on compensation matters.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
27. The compensation interests of service members are being adequately served by the 
senior military command.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
28. As long as it does not interfere with good order and discipline, military personnel 
need a union to defend their interests.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
29. In today’s technical armed forces, we really don’t need so much military ritual and 
tradition as in times past.  
     1       2        3      4       5 
Demographics: 
1. Current Rank: 
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a. E-4          g. O-1 
b. E-5  h. O-2 
c. E-6  i.  O-3 
d. E-7  j.  O-4 
e. E-8  k. O-5 
f. E-9  l.  O-6                       
 
2. Commissioning Source: 
a. Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) 
b. USAFA (or other military academy) 
c. ROTC 
d. OTS 
e. AECP (or other enlisted to officer program) 
f. Other 
 
3. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed: 
a. High School or less 
b. Associates Degree 
c. Bachelor’s Degree 
d. Masters/PhD 
  
4. Primary career field (AFSC): ________________ 
 
5. Enlisted PME completed (Please check all that apply): 
a. Airman Leadership School 
b. Non-Commissioned Officer Academy  
c. Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy by correspondence 
d. Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy in-residence 
e. Not applicable 
 
6.  Officer PME completed (please check all that apply): 
a. Air and Space Basic Course 
b. Squadron Officer School by correspondence 
c. Squadron Officer School in-residence 
d. Intermediate Developmental Education--Air Command and Staff College program 
by correspondence 
e. Intermediate Developmental Education--any qualified in-residence program such 
as Air Command and Staff College, Naval Post Graduate School, Army Command 
and General Staff, etc. 
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f. Senior Developmental Education--Air War College program by correspondence 
g. Senior Developmental Education--any qualified in-residence program, such as Air 
War College, Naval War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, etc. 
h. Not applicable 
 




8.  Total years in service:  _______ 
9.   If you are a commissioned officer, how many years were you prior enlisted?  
______ 
10.   Total number of assignments:  ________  
 
11.  Total number of overseas assignments:  ________  
12. Total number of dependents:  ________  












Appendix B.  Officer Promotion Criteria 
The below chart is derived from DOD Instruction 1320.13. It shows the point where 
commissioned officers (in any of the services) can expect to be promoted (assuming they 
are selected for promotion), based upon their time-in-service. Minimum time-in-grade for 









18 months  18 months  
Fully qualified (nearly 100 
percent) 
0-3 4 years 2 years  Fully qualified (nearly 100 
percent)  
0-4 10 years  3 years  Best qualified (80 percent) 
0-5 16 years 3 years  Best qualified (70 percent) 
0-6 22 years  3 years  Best qualified (50 percent) 
The above chart shows promotion time-in-service flow and promotion opportunity rates 
for "in the zone" promotion.  
Commissioned officers are recommended for promotion by their commanders, and are 
selected by centralized (service-wide) promotion boards, which make promotion 
determinations based upon the officers' promotion records.  
There are basically three promotion opportunities: Below-the-Zone, In-the-Zone, and 
Above-the-Zone. Below-the-Zone only applies for promotion to the rank of O-4 to O-6.  
One year before they would be eligible for In-the-Zone consideration, up to 10 percent of 
those recommended can be promoted Below-the-Zone.  Most promotions occur In-the-
Zone. Those not selected In-the-Zone have one more chances, a year later -- Above-the-
Zone (the selection rate for Above-the-Zone is *extremely small* -- around 3 percent). 
Those "passed over" Above-the-Zone must separate or retire (if eligible for retirement).  
The two most significant factors in an officer's promotion records are inarguably their 
fitness report(s) and level of responsibility in their current and past assignments.  
Commanders write promotion recommendation forms that indicate one of three 
categories:  1. Definitely Promote 2. Promote 3. Do Not Promote 
Note:  the ‘Definitely Promote’ rating is limited and based on a quota system 
(http://usmilitary.about.com/od/promotions/l/blofficerprom.htm) 
 
Appendix C.  Enlisted Promotion Criteria  
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Evaluation Board 
The evaluation board is very important because it accounts for over half the total score.  The 
board looks at performance, education, breadth of experience, job responsibility, professional  
competence, specific achievements, and leadership.   
Scoring:   
After the trial run is completed and discussed, panels begin the actual scoring of live records. The same panel 
evaluates all eligibles competing in a CEM code or AFSC. Each panel member scores each record, using a 6- to 
10-point scale using half-point increments. An individual’s record may receive a panel composite score (three 
members) from a minimum of 18 (6-6-6) to a maximum of 30 (10-10-10) points. The composite score (18 to 30 
points) is later multiplied by a factor of 15, resulting in a total board score (270 to 450). Using a secret ballot, 
panel members score the record individually with no discussion. Records are given to each panel member in a 
stack of 20; and after they are scored, the ballots are given directly to a recorder. This ensures each panel 




any of the panel members (for example, 8.5, 8.0, and 7.0) is termed a split vote and is returned to the panel for 
resolution. At this point, all panel members may discuss the record openly among themselves. This allows them 
to state why they scored the record as they did. Only panel members who caused the split may change their 
scores. If panel members cannot come to an agreement on the split vote, they give the record to the board 
president for resolution. This ensures consistency of scoring and eliminates the possibility that one panel member 



























Appendix F.  United States Air Force Supervisory Examination Table of Contents 
            (AFPAM36-2241V2 1 JULY 2005) 
Chapter 1—STUDYING EFFECTIVELY 
Chapter 2—ORGANIZATION 
Chapter 3—AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND JOINT FORCE 
Chapter 4—FULL SPECTRUM THREAT RESPONSE 
Chapter 5—STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
Chapter 6—ENFORCING STANDARDS AND LEGAL ISSUES 
Chapter 7—MILITARY CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES AND PROTOCOL FOR 
SPECIAL EVENTS 
Chapter 8—THE NCO AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 
Chapter 9—LEADERSHIP AND SNCO LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND 
MENTORSHIP 
Chapter 10—THE ENLISTED EVALUATION SYSTEM (EES) 
Chapter 11—TRAINING AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND SNCO 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Chapter 12—COMMUNICATING IN TODAY’S AIR FORCE AND STAFF LEVEL 
COMMUNICATION 
Chapter 13—MISSION SUPPORT 
Chapter 14—WING SUPPORT 
Chapter 15—DRESS AND APPEARANCE 
Chapter 16—FIT FORCE 
Chapter 17—SECURITY 
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